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INTRODUCTION 
In scholarly discourse about rights, it is often assumed that 
democracy is bad for rights. Rights protect individuals. 
Democratically enacted laws reflect the will of the majority. The 
“tyranny of the majority,” as John Stuart Mill warned long ago, 
threatens the rights of individuals.1 
It is not necessarily so. There are important examples in 
recent US history where majoritarian democracy produced 
legislation strengthening protection for individual rights. The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 the Voting Rights Act of 1965,3 the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,4 and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 19935 are just a few examples of 
rights-enhancing federal legislation supported by broad-based 
democratic majorities.6 Of course, in the past two decades 
Congress also enacted important legislation, such as the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19967 and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,8 that restricted protection 
of individual rights. 
Even so, this Article contends that: (1) the time is ripe for 
federal legislation to facilitate domestic judicial application of 
international human rights treaty obligations; and (2) such 
legislation would yield substantial domestic and foreign policy 
                                                                                                             
1. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 62–63 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin 
Books 1974) (1859). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)).  
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)). 
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)). 
5. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)). The Supreme Court invalidated 
the statute in part in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–36 (1997), but the statute 
remains in force insofar as it applies to the federal government. 
6. See infra notes 171–74 (providing data on bipartisan support for the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990). 
7. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) 
8. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)). 
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benefits for the United States. The first claim may seem 
shocking, even preposterous. In the 2010 elections, Republicans 
scored one of the biggest electoral landslides in the past 
century.9 Moreover, Republican lawmakers are generally hostile 
to the domestic judicial application of international human 
rights law, as evidenced by recent legislative efforts at both the 
state10 and federal11 level to bar judicial reliance on international 
law to resolve domestic controversies. 
Granted, the current Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives is unlikely to support legislation promoting 
domestic judicial application of international human rights 
treaties. Nevertheless, two points merit emphasis. First, electoral 
majorities can change very quickly.12 Hence, within the next few 
years, Democrats could possibly control the House, the Senate, 
and the Presidency, as they did in the 111th Congress (2009–
10).13 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the composition 
of the federal judiciary changes much more slowly than the 
composition of Congress. At present, a majority of federal 
judges have ideological predilections making them unreceptive 
to claims for vigorous domestic judicial enforcement of 
international human rights norms.14 Hence, if the United States 
is going to take positive steps toward greater judicial protection 
                                                                                                             
9. See Chris Cillizza, Election 2010: Republicans Net 60 House Seats, 6 Senate Seats and 
7 Governorships, WASH. POST THE FIX BLOG (Nov. 3, 2010, 8:24 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thefix/morning-fix/2010-election-republican-
score.html (“Historically, the Republican gains mark the biggest midterm election seat 
swap since 1938 when Democrats lost 71 House seats. It has already eclipsed the 1994 
Republican tidal wave in which the GOP netted 52 seats.”). 
10. See Aaron Fellmeth, International Law and Foreign Laws in the U.S. State 
Legislatures, ASIL INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/
insight110526.pdf. 
11. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act, H.R. 1070, 109th Cong. (2005); see also 
Mark Tushnet, The “Constitution Restoration Act” and Judicial Independence: Some 
Observations, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1071 (2006) (discussing proposed federal 
legislation). 
12. See infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text (supporting this claim). 
13.  In the 2008 elections, Democrats gained a 261–174 majority in the House, 
and a 57–2–41 majority in the Senate, with the two independents caucusing with the 
Democrats. See JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40086, MEMBERSHIP OF 
THE 111TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 1 (2010).  
14. See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text (stating that the majority of 
judges on the US Courts of Appeals were appointed by Republicans and that the 
median federal appellate judge is moderately conservative according to empirical 
studies). 
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of international human rights within the next decade, the 
impetus is likely to come from legislation, not litigation. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I 
shows that current US practice falls short of international 
human rights standards. Over the past decade, the United States 
has violated several distinct human rights treaty provisions. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of US compliance with its human rights 
treaty obligations. Instead, Part I focuses on three specific issues: 
life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders; felon 
disenfranchisement laws; and prison conditions in maximum 
security prisons. 
Part II explains why the United States should comply with 
its international human rights treaty commitments. First, in 
areas where US policies and practices have strayed from core 
American values, domestic implementation of international 
human rights law would help align domestic policies with those 
core values. Second, the US failure to comply with its human 
rights treaty obligations has significant diplomatic and foreign 
policy costs. 
Part III considers different possible pathways to achieve US 
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations. The analysis 
suggests that state governments, the federal executive, and the 
federal judiciary—acting separately or in combination—are 
unlikely to adopt the measures needed to achieve US 
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations. 
Accordingly, federal legislation is necessary. Part III contends 
that Congress should enact federal legislation to expand the 
availability of judicial remedies for international human rights 
treaty violations in the United States. The Appendix includes 
draft legislation to this effect. 
Before proceeding further, one caveat is necessary. US 
policies in the War on Terror have been the target of intense 
criticism. Many critics allege that specific US counterterrorism 
measures violate US treaty obligations under human rights 
and/or humanitarian law treaties.15 Although I am sympathetic 
                                                                                                             
15. The literature in this area is quite extensive. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & 
Andrea W. Templeton, Fair Trials? The Manual for Military Commissions in Light of 
Common Article 3 and Other International Law, 26 L. & INEQUALITY 353 (2008); Leila 
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to those criticisms, the focus of this Article is different. I hope to 
persuade the reader that a variety of US policies and practices 
unrelated to the War on Terror are inconsistent with the 
nation’s human rights treaty obligations and that there are 
sound reasons to adopt legislation to enhance compliance with 
those treaty obligations. The draft legislation in the Appendix 
specifically exempts issues related to the War on Terror, in part 
because those issues are already the subject of legislative debate. 
In contrast, for the past decade or more, Congress has devoted 
scant attention to the types of human rights violations that are 
the primary subject of this Article. 
I. US NONCOMPLIANCE WITH HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
OBLIGATIONS 
The United States ratified the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)16 in 1992, followed by the 
Convention against Racial Discrimination17 and the Convention 
against Torture18 in 1994. When it ratified these treaties, the 
United States adopted reservations and understandings 
(“RUDs”) to limit the scope of its treaty obligations. One key 
goal of the RUDs was to ensure that the United States could 
achieve compliance with its treaty obligations simply by 
implementing pre-existing statutory and constitutional law. 
Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton assured the 
Senate that the United States could comply fully with its treaty 
obligations—as modified by the RUDs—without having to make 
                                                                                                             
Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on 
Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200 (2007). 
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST 
OF TREATIES OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE 
ON JANUARY 1, 2011, at 383 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/169274.pdf. 
17. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1978) 
[hereinafter Race Convention]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 16, at 447. 
18. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
(1988) [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 16, at 
472. 
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any changes in domestic legal norms. The Senate relied on 
those assurances as a basis for its consent to treaty ratification.19 
As of 1994, it was probably true that the United States could 
have achieved full compliance, or almost full compliance, with 
its treaty obligations by aggressively implementing the human 
rights protections then available under federal statutory and 
constitutional law. However, since that time, many states have 
adopted laws and policies that are in tension with the nation’s 
human rights treaty obligations20 and the federal government 
has done little to counter those trends. Meanwhile, Congress has 
enacted several statutes restricting the availability of judicial 
remedies for individuals whose constitutional and statutory 
rights are violated.21 Additionally, the federal courts have 
adopted narrowing interpretations of both substantive rights 
and judicial remedies,22 thereby restricting the scope of 
protection available under statutory and constitutional 
provisions that Presidents Bush and Clinton relied upon as a 
basis for assurances that the United States would comply with its 
human rights treaty obligations. The net effect of these 
developments is that the US record of compliance with human 
rights treaty obligations is worse today than it was in 1994. 
Numerous aspects of US policies and practices do not 
satisfy international human rights standards.23 This Part 
                                                                                                             
19. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-
Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 139–42, 175–88 
(1999) (providing detailed support for the claims made in this paragraph). 
20. See infra notes 24–29, 43–45, 77–87 and accompanying text. 
21. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) (restricting the 
availability of federal habeas corpus relief for individuals convicted of crimes in state 
courts); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)) (restricting the availability of 
judicial remedies for prisoners who allege violations of their constitutional rights); 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)) (providing 
for expedited removal of so-called “criminal aliens”). 
22. See generally Marsha S. Berzon, Securing Fragile Foundations: Affirmative 
Constitutional Adjudication in Federal Courts, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (2009); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343 (2002); Judith 
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. 
L.J. 223 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as 
an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006). 
23. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of 
the Committee against Torture: United States of America, U.N. Doc. 
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addresses three issues: (i) life without parole for juvenile 
offenders, (ii) felon disenfranchisement laws, and (iii) 
conditions in maximum security prisons. These examples 
illustrate the ways in which US policies and practices unrelated 
to the War on Terror are inconsistent with US obligations under 
international human rights treaties. 
A. Juvenile Life Without Parole 
As of early 2010, there were more than 2500 individuals 
serving life without parole (“LWOP”) sentences in the United 
States for crimes they committed as juveniles.24 The US Supreme 
Court ruled in May 2010 in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juveniles who 
committed non-homicide offenses.25 The Court’s ruling 
effectively reversed the LWOP sentences of 123 juvenile 
offenders.26 That still leaves more than 2400 juvenile offenders 
convicted of homicide offenses who are serving LWOP 
sentences. As of 1992, when the United States ratified the 
ICCPR, there were fewer than 500 juvenile offenders serving 
LWOP sentences.27 As of 1976, when the ICCPR first entered 
into force internationally, there were fewer than twenty juvenile 
offenders serving LWOP sentences.28 Thus, the magnitude of 
the problem has increased exponentially over the past few 
decades.29 
                                                                                                             
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (evaluating US compliance with the Torture 
Convention); U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United 
States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008) (evaluating US 
compliance with the Race Convention); U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of America, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Concluding Observations: 
Human Rights Committee] (evaluating US compliance with the ICCPR). 
24. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE 16 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf 
(reporting a total of 2574 juvenile offenders serving life without parole ("LWOP") 
sentences in the United States). 
25. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2014–15 (2010). 
26. See id. at 2023–24. 
27. See AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005). 
28. See id. 
29. The annual number of juvenile LWOP sentences peaked in about 1996–97 
and began declining after that. See id. 
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Article 24(1) of the ICCPR provides: “Every child shall have 
.   . . such measures of protection as are required by his status as a 
minor.”30 Although the United States adopted various 
reservations to limit the scope of its treaty obligations when it 
ratified the ICCPR, it did not adopt any reservation to Article 
24(1).31 Hence, Article 24(1) imposes a legally binding treaty 
obligation on the United States.32 The Human Rights 
Committee, which is the treaty body created by the ICCPR to 
oversee treaty implementation, has expressed the view that 
“sentencing children to [a] life sentence without parole is of 
itself not in compliance with [A]rticle 24(1) of the Covenant.”33 
The Committee’s conclusion that juvenile LWOP violates 
Article 24(1) is not dispositive because the ICCPR does not 
grant the Committee authority to issue final, authoritative treaty 
interpretations. Even so, other authorities support the 
Committee’s view that a ban on juvenile LWOP is a “measure of 
protection” required by Article 24. First, the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Graham contains a lengthy passage explaining why—
due to unique features of juvenile offenders—the imposition of 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders constitutes “cruel and 
unusual punishment” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.34 
The Court’s rationale also supports the conclusion that special 
psychological and emotional characteristics of children mean 
that a ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders is required 
under Article 24. 
Second, Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties stipulates that “any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation” must be considered in 
                                                                                                             
30. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 24(1). 
31. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (showing the US 
reservations to the ICCPR). 
32. The United States did adopt a reservation to Article 10, stipulating that “the 
United States reserves the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as 
adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Article 10.” See id. However, that 
reservation does not purport to restrict or modify US obligations under Article 24. See 
id. 
33. Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para. 34. 
34. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–30 (2010). 
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ascertaining the correct interpretation of the treaty.35 Since 
entry into force of the ICCPR, states throughout the world have 
prohibited the imposition of LWOP sentences for juvenile 
offenders. More than 190 nations are parties to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which expressly prohibits the 
imposition of “life imprisonment without possibility of 
release . . . for offences committed by persons below eighteen 
years of age.”36 Moreover, a comprehensive survey of domestic 
laws and practices shows that “only 11 nations authorize life 
without parole for juvenile offenders under any circumstances; 
and only 2 of them, the United States and [one other state], 
ever impose the punishment in practice.”37 Thus, consistent 
state practice since entry into force of the ICCPR manifests near-
universal agreement that a ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile 
offenders is a “measure of protection” required by their status as 
minors, and hence required by Article 24 of the ICCPR. 
The United States’ failure to comply with Article 24 is 
attributable to several factors. First, there has been a trend in 
state criminal justice policies throughout the United States 
towards progressively harsher sentences for criminal offenders. 
This trend began before the United States ratified the ICCPR 
and has continued since. The Supreme Court could apply the 
Eighth Amendment to curb the harshest consequences of this 
trend, but the Court has imposed few Eighth Amendment 
constraints on state criminal sentencing practices outside the 
death penalty context.38 Congress could invoke its treaty 
                                                                                                             
35. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
36. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
37. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033 (citing MICHELLE LEIGHTON & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, 
SENTENCING OUR CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON: GLOBAL LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2007) 
(unpublished manuscript)). The Court’s opinion in Graham cites Professors Leighton 
and de la Vega for the proposition that Israel also imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile 
offenders. An Israeli colleague assures me that this is not true. Thus, the United States 
may be the only state in the world that actually imposes LWOP sentences on juvenile 
offenders. 
38. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (rejecting the Eighth 
Amendment challenge to California’s “three strikes” law); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957 (1991) (holding that a mandatory life sentence for drug possession did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding that 
a mandatory life sentence under a Texas recidivist statute did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment). Under the Court’s analysis in Graham, the Court looks for “objective 
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implementation power, as recognized in Missouri v. Holland,39 to 
constrain state criminal justice policies that are inconsistent with 
US treaty obligations, but to date Congress has shown little 
inclination to do so. Moreover, some commentators assert that 
Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Lopez40 and United 
States v. Morrison41 raise doubts about the scope of Congress’ 
treaty implementation power under Missouri.42 
B. Felon Disenfranchisement Laws 
According to the best available data, “more than 5 million 
citizens will be ineligible to vote in the midterm elections in 
November [2010], including nearly 4 million who reside in the 
35 states that still prohibit some combination of persons on 
probation, parole, and/or people who have completed their 
sentence from voting.”43 Felon disenfranchisement laws affect 
three groups of people: those currently in prison, those released 
on probation or parole, and those convicted felons who have 
fully served their sentences and have been released for re-
integration into the community. Non-incarcerated felons “make 
up approximately three-quarters of the disenfranchised 
                                                                                                             
indicia of society’s standards . . . to determine whether there is a national consensus 
against the sentencing practice at issue.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). The Court found a consensus against juvenile LWOP for non-homicide 
offenses. See id. at 2023–26. However, the Court would be hard pressed to find a 
national (vice international) consensus against juvenile LWOP for homicide offenses. 
Therefore, the Court is unlikely to rule that juvenile LWOP for homicide violates the 
Eighth Amendment. 
39. 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (holding that Congress has the power to enact legislation 
designed to implement a treaty, even if the legislation would be invalid in the absence 
of a treaty). 
40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
41. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  
42. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. 
L. REV. 390 (1998) (urging the Supreme Court to overrule Missouri); Nicholas Quinn 
Rosencranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005) (also advocating 
a reversal of Missouri, but for different reasons). But see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making 
and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000) (defending the continued vitality of the Court’s holding 
in Missouri). 
43. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE 
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM, 1997–2010, at 3 (2010). 
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population . . . .”44 “While a number of other countries . . . 
deny voting rights to prison inmates, the United States is unique 
in restricting the rights of nonincarcerated felons . . . .”45 
Under Article 25 of the ICCPR, “[e]very citizen shall have 
the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable 
restrictions . . . [t]o vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage . . . .”46 
The “distinctions mentioned in [A]rticle 2” include distinctions 
based on race.47 In the United States, “[r]acial disparities in the 
criminal justice system . . . translate into higher rates of 
disenfranchisement in communities of color, resulting in one of 
every eight adult black males being ineligible to vote.”48 Given 
the disproportionate impact of felon disenfranchisement laws 
on black males, such laws are arguably inconsistent with the US 
treaty obligation to “ensure” the right to vote “to all individuals 
within its territory . . . without distinction of any kind . . . .”49 
Indeed, the Human Rights Committee has concluded that felon 
disenfranchisement laws in the United States “do not meet the 
requirements” of the ICCPR.50 However, that conclusion must 
be qualified because the United States ratified the ICCPR 
subject to an “understanding” that the treaty permits 
“distinctions based upon race . . . when such distinctions are, at 
minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
objective.”51 
Setting aside the racially discriminatory impact of felon 
disenfranchisement laws, there is a compelling argument that a 
                                                                                                             
44. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences 
of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 778 (2002). 
45. Id. 
46. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25. 
47. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2. 
48. Porter, supra note 43, at 3.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. One detailed 
study concluded that, due to the racially discriminatory impact of felon 
disenfranchisement laws, those laws “played a decisive role in [some] US Senate 
elections in recent years. Moreover, at least one Republican presidential victory would 
have been reversed if former felons had been allowed to vote.” Uggen & Manza, supra 
note 44, at 777. 
49. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2. 
50. See Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para. 
35. 
51. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31.  
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subset of such laws are inconsistent with US treaty obligations 
under Article 25 of the ICCPR.52 Article 25 prohibits 
“unreasonable restrictions” on the right to vote. The United 
States did not adopt any reservation to Article 25;53 hence, the 
treaty prohibition on “unreasonable restrictions” is binding on 
the United States as a matter of international law. Over the past 
decade, the Supreme Court of Canada,54 the South African 
Constitutional Court,55 the Australian High Court,56 and the 
European Court of Human Rights (in cases originating in the 
United Kingdom and Austria)57 have all held that laws 
disenfranchising incarcerated prisoners impose unreasonable 
restrictions on the prisoners’ voting rights.58 None of those cases 
involved disenfranchisement of convicted felons who had been 
released from prison. 
In contrast, as noted above, non-incarcerated felons “make 
up approximately three-quarters of the disenfranchised 
population” in the United States.59 Twelve states in the United 
States maintain laws that deprive at least some ex-offenders of 
the right to vote even after they have fully served their 
sentences.60 If disenfranchisement of incarcerated prisoners is 
unreasonable, as held by foreign and international tribunals, 
then the US practice of disenfranchising ex-felons who have 
                                                                                                             
52. See generally Reuven Ziegler, Legal Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage: 
Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 197 (2011) 
(providing a detailed defense of this argument). 
53. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31. 
54. See Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (Can.). 
55. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Nat’l Inst. for Crime Prevention & the Reintegration 
of Offenders (NICRO) 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
56. Roach v. Electoral Comm'r [2007] 233 CLR 162 (Austl.). 
57. Frodl v. Austria, App. No. 20201/04, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 (2011); Hirst v. 
United Kingdom (No.2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187. 
58. None of the cited decisions is based primarily on Article 25 of the ICCPR. 
Nevertheless, the primary rationale for all of these decisions was that the challenged 
restrictions on voting rights were unreasonable. See generally Ziegler, supra note 52; 
Michael Plaxton & Heather Lardy, Prisoner Disenfranchisement: Four Judicial Approaches, 
28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 101 (2010). 
59. Uggen & Manza, supra note 44, at 778. 
60. Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia “deny the right to vote to all persons 
with felony convictions, even after they have completed their sentences.” THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 
(2011). Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, and 
Wyoming “disenfranchise certain categories of ex-offenders and/or permit application 
for restoration of rights for specified offenses after a waiting period.” See id. at 1, 3 tbl.  
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been released from prison and are no longer on probation or 
parole is clearly an “unreasonable restriction” within the 
meaning of Article 25. Indeed, the National Commission on 
Federal Election Reform recommended in 2001 that all states 
restore voting rights to citizens who fully serve their sentences,61 
but that recommendation has not been fully implemented. 
Hence, the Human Rights Committee correctly concluded “that 
general deprivation of the right to vote for persons who have 
received a felony conviction, and in particular those who are no 
longer deprived of liberty, do not meet the requirements of 
[A]rticle[] 25” of the ICCPR.62  
In contrast to the juvenile LWOP issue, US practice 
involving felon disenfranchisement has improved somewhat 
since the mid-1990s. “[S]ince 1997, 23 states have amended 
felony disenfranchisement policies in an effort to reduce their 
restrictiveness and expand voter eligibility.”63 Despite these 
improvements, the laws in many states remain inconsistent with 
the nation’s treaty obligations under the ICCPR. One could 
blame US non-compliance on recalcitrant state legislators, but 
that explanation is not entirely convincing. The federal 
executive branch could take significant steps to remedy the 
problem by engaging in more vigorous enforcement of the 
Voting Rights Act.64 Insofar as the president’s current authority 
may be insufficient, Congress could amend the Voting Rights 
Act to expand the president’s authority to compel changes in 
state laws to ensure full compliance with US treaty obligations.65 
                                                                                                             
61. See THE NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND 
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 45 (2001). 
62. Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para. 35. 
63. Porter, supra note 43, at 1. 
64. See generally Daniel H. Wolf, An Extraordinary Facilitator: The Voting Rights Act 
and U.S. Adherence to International Human Rights Treaty Obligations, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
1149 (2010). 
65. There are two independent constitutional arguments that Congress could 
invoke as a basis for its authority to enact such legislation. First, Congress could invoke 
its treaty implementation power under Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). In this 
author’s opinion, Congress’ power to implement treaties should be sufficient to sustain 
the constitutional validity of legislation that Congress deems necessary to ensure 
compliance with US treaty obligations. However, the scope of Congress’ treaty 
implementation power is contested. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Second, 
Congress could invoke its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, at 
least insofar as federal legislation is designed to remedy racially discriminatory effects 
of felon disenfranchisement laws. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see 
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C. Prison Overcrowding and Maximum Security Prisons 
Article 10(1) of the ICCPR provides: “All persons deprived 
of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the human person.”66 The United 
States did not adopt a reservation to limit the scope of its 
obligations under this provision.67 Hence, the provision is 
binding on the United States under international law. There are 
two reasons why the record of US compliance with Article 10(1) 
has deteriorated since the United States ratified the ICCPR in 
1992. First, any Eighth Amendment violation related to 
prisoners’ rights is also a violation of Article 10(1). Second, the 
available evidence suggests that the incidence of prisoners’ 
rights violations—especially unremedied violations—has 
increased significantly since 1995. 
Consider, first, the relationship between Article 10(1) and 
the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment creates only 
negative obligations: it prohibits “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”68 In contrast, Article 10(1) of the ICCPR creates 
an affirmative obligation to treat prisoners “with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person.” Thus, a purely textual 
analysis suggests that international law sets a higher standard 
than domestic law. However, two factors counterbalance this 
textual analysis. First, US prisoners are protected by the full 
panoply of constitutional rights, including the First 
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause, in addition to the Eighth 
Amendment.69 Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
expanded the reach of the Eighth Amendment well beyond the 
plain meaning of the text. Under established doctrine, the 
Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials an affirmative 
duty to care for prisoners.70 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly 
                                                                                                             
also Wolf, supra note 64, at 1173–77 (discussing reliance on Section 5 to promote 
compliance with human rights treaty obligations). 
66. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 10(1). 
67. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31. 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
69. See generally MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (3d ed. 2003). 
70. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). 
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affirmed that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”71 
Even so, there are certain respects in which international 
human rights law is more protective of prisoners’ rights than US 
constitutional law. To succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim 
challenging conditions of confinement, a prisoner must satisfy 
both an objective and subjective test.72 To satisfy the objective 
component of the test, prisoners must show that they have been 
deprived “of a single, identifiable human need such as food, 
warmth, or exercise . . . .”73 In contrast, the European Court of 
Human Rights has set a much lower standard for “degrading 
treatment” claims, holding that treatment is degrading if it is 
“such as to arouse in the victims feeling [sic] of fear, anguish 
and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them.”74 
Moreover, the European Court does not require prisoners to 
prove any particular mens rea element to establish a claim for 
degrading treatment.75 In contrast, the subjective component of 
an Eighth Amendment claim requires a showing of “deliberate 
indifference” to the prisoner’s needs, which the Court has 
construed as a recklessness standard.76 Thus, one may fairly 
conclude, at a minimum, that any violation of a prisoner’s 
Eighth Amendment rights is also a violation of ICCPR Article 
10(1). 
Moreover, the incidence of unremedied Eighth 
Amendment violations has increased significantly since the 
United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. This is due to a 
confluence of three factors: 1) passage of the Prison Litigation 
                                                                                                             
71. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958))). 
72. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–302 (1991). 
73. Id. at 304. 
74. Van der Ven v. Netherlands, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, ¶ 48 (2003). The 
jurisprudence of the European Court provides persuasive, but not binding, authority 
for interpreting analogous provisions of the ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee 
often consults the European Court’s jurisprudence as a guide to construing analogous 
ICCPR provisions. Moreover, the language in Article 7 of the ICCPR is virtually 
identical to the language in Article 3 of the European Convention. Compare ICCPR, 
supra note 16, art. 7 (prohibiting “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”) with European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (prohibiting “inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment”). 
75. See Iwanczuk v. Poland, 38 E.H.R.R. 8, ¶¶ 51–52 (2001). 
76. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 836–37 (1994). 
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Reform Act in 1995; 2) the dramatic growth in the US prison 
population over the past two decades; and 3) increased numbers 
of prisoners housed in maximum security prisons. 
Judicial oversight of prison conditions has declined as a 
result of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).77 Since 
passage of the PLRA, “prisoners’ federal filing rates have 
declined 60 percent, from 26 federal cases per thousand 
prisoners in 1995 to fewer than 11 cases per thousand prisoners 
in 2006.”78 Proponents of the PLRA hoped that the legislation 
would reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits without affecting 
meritorious claims. Unfortunately, the best available empirical 
analysis suggests that the PLRA has also made it much more 
difficult for prisoners to bring meritorious claims,79 thereby 
increasing the number of constitutional violations that are left 
without a remedy. 
Second, the number of prisoners detained in state and 
federal correctional institutions has grown enormously over the 
past fifteen years. Federal prisons housed about 205,000 inmates 
in 2009,80 more than double the figure of about 82,000 inmates 
in 1995.81 State prisons housed about 1.32 million inmates in 
2009,82 compared to roughly 942,000 inmates in 1995.83 
Construction of additional prison capacity has not kept pace 
with the increasing prison population. Federal prisons were 
operating at thirty-seven percent over capacity in 2005, 
compared to twenty-four percent over capacity in 1995. State 
prisons were operating at twelve percent over capacity in 2005, 
compared to three percent over capacity in 1995.84 The 
                                                                                                             
77. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 
(1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006)). 
78. Margo Schlanger et al., ABA Criminal Justice Standards on the Treatment of 
Prisoners, 25 SUM CRIM. JUST. 14, 19 (2010). 
79. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1644–64 
(2003). 
80. LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
231681, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009, at 1, 7 app. tbl.2 
(2010). 
81. JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
164266, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, at iv (1997). 
82. See GLAZE, supra note 80, at 1, 7 app. tbl.2. 
83. See STEPHAN, supra note 81, at iv. 
84. See JAMES J. STEPHAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
NCJ 222182, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005, at 3 
(2005); see also STEPHAN, supra note 81, at iv. 
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Supreme Court has acknowledged that overcrowding can be a 
key factor contributing to the deprivation of prisoners’ 
constitutional rights.85 
The population of maximum security prisons has also 
grown steadily over the past two decades.86 Although each 
maximum security prison is different, these prisons, as a group, 
impose the most severe restrictions on individual liberty, and 
hence raise the most significant human rights concerns. The 
Supreme Court described the conditions in one maximum 
security prison as follows: 
Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form 
of incarceration in Ohio . . . In OSP almost every aspect of 
an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must 
remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 
hours per day. A light remains on in the cell at all times, 
though it is sometimes dimmed, and an inmate who 
attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to further 
discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may 
leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor 
recreation cells. Incarceration at OSP is synonymous with 
extreme isolation . . . OSP cells have solid metal doors with 
metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent 
conversation or communication with other inmates. All 
meals are taken alone in the inmate’s cell instead of in a 
common eating area. Opportunities for visitation are rare 
and in all events are conducted through glass walls. It is fair 
to say OSP inmates are deprived of almost any 
environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all human 
contact.87 
Such conditions appear to be incompatible with standards 
for conditions of confinement recently promulgated by the 
American Bar Association.88 Not surprisingly, the Human Rights 
                                                                                                             
85. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011). 
86. Federal maximum security prisons housed 21,855 inmates in 2005, compared 
to 9272 inmates in 1995. State maximum security prisons housed 491,240 inmates in 
2005, compared to 354,000 inmates in 1995. See STEPHAN, supra note 84, app. tbl.11; 
STEPHAN, supra note 81, at 9.  
87. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005). 
88. See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS 23-3.1–23-3.9 (3d ed. 2010). 
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Committee concluded “that conditions in some maximum 
security prisons are incompatible” with US obligations under 
Article 10(1).89 
In sum, the dramatic growth in the nation’s prison 
population since 1995, and especially the increased numbers of 
prisoners housed in maximum security prisons, has undoubtedly 
led to an increase in the overall number of prisoners who have 
legitimate grievances about violations of their constitutional 
rights. Meanwhile, the PLRA has led to an increase in the 
percentage of constitutional violations that go unremedied. 
Since every violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights is also a 
violation of US human rights treaty obligations, the gap between 
treaty requirements and US performance has expanded 
significantly since the United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992. 
II. WHY SHOULD THE UNITED STATES COMPLY WITH 
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY COMMITMENTS? 
Part I showed that the United States is not complying fully 
with its human rights treaty obligations. But, one might ask, why 
should the United States comply with its treaty commitments? 
Part II contends that the United States should comply with its 
human rights treaty obligations to promote both foreign and 
domestic policy goals. The nation’s failure to comply with its 
treaty obligations has a significant negative impact on key 
foreign policy objectives. Moreover, compliance with 
international human rights norms would help the United States 
fulfill the higher moral aspirations of its citizens. The next two 
Sections consider each set of arguments separately. 
A. Foreign Policy Considerations 
In 1974, Congress enacted legislation specifying that “a 
principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be 
to promote the increased observance of internationally 
recognized human rights by all countries.”90 The legislation 
added that the goal of promoting “increased respect for human 
                                                                                                             
89. See Concluding Observations: Human Rights Committee, supra note 23, para. 
32. 
90. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 502B, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2006)). 
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rights and fundamental freedoms” was consistent with US 
obligations under the UN Charter and “in keeping with the 
constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States.”91 
Since that time, Congress has enacted numerous statutes—such 
as the International Religious Freedom Act of 199892 and the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 200093—
designed to promote greater protection for human rights in 
countries around the world.94 
One key element of the federal statutory scheme is a 
requirement for the US Department of State to provide annual 
reports on human rights practices in foreign countries.95 As 
Professor Sarah Cleveland has noted, the requirement to 
compile information for the annual reports “provokes constant 
interactions around human rights norms between US and 
foreign government personnel and other foreign actors.”96 
Consequently, international human rights concerns have 
become an integral part of the day-to-day conduct of US foreign 
affairs. An official State Department publication released during 
the Reagan administration asserted: “The cause of human rights 
forms the core of American foreign policy; it is central to 
America’s conception of itself.”97 Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton recently declared that the cause of advancing 
“human rights is a daily priority for the men and women of the 
Department of State, both in Washington and in our embassies 
overseas.”98 
When the United States breaches its international treaty 
commitments it undermines diplomatic efforts to promote 
respect for human rights in other countries. In a series of 
amicus briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court over the past 
decade, former senior diplomats have highlighted the link 
                                                                                                             
91. Id. 
92. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 
2787 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (2006)). 
93. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2006)). 
94. For a brief summary of US legislation on human rights, see LOUIS HENKIN ET 
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 1025–28, 1037–41 (2d ed. 2009). 
95. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (2006). 
96. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 90 (2001). 
97. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FUNDAMENTALS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 24 (1988). 
98. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: PREFACE (2011). 
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between respect for human rights at home and the conduct of 
US foreign policy abroad. For example, in 2001, former 
diplomats argued in a case involving capital punishment of 
mentally retarded individuals that “the current United States 
practice of executing people suffering from mental retardation 
is inconsistent with evolving international standards of decency,” 
and “that North Carolina’s continuation of the practice in this 
case would strain diplomatic relations with close American allies, 
increasing America’s diplomatic isolation and impairing other 
United States foreign policy interests.”99 The same group of nine 
former diplomats—a group that included some of the nation’s 
most illustrious ambassadors100—raised similar concerns a few 
years later in a case involving the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders.101 
A distinct group of former US diplomats filed a series of 
amicus briefs in support of individuals detained in the War on 
Terror. For example, in Rasul v. Bush,102 a case involving 
detention of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, a 
distinguished group of former US diplomats asserted: 
The courts below denied review of the executive branch’s 
incarceration of the petitioners, effectively holding that 
when the executive acts against foreign citizens on foreign 
soil, it may do so with impunity, free of even minimal 
judicial review. These rulings undermine what has long 
been one of our proudest diplomatic advantages—this 
nation’s constitutional guaranty, enforced by an 
independent judiciary, against arbitrary government power. 
The rulings have not gone unnoticed abroad. [Some 
foreign] [g]overnments . . . have even interpreted the 
                                                                                                             
99. Brief for Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 531 U.S. 1205 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL 
648607, at *2. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed McCarver v. North Carolina, but 
considered the identical issue in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
100. The amici in these cases included four career diplomats who “retired with 
the rank of Career Ambassador, the highest rank that can be awarded to members of 
the United States Foreign Service.” See Brief for Former U.S. Diplomats Morton 
Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448, at *5. 
101. See id. 
102. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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rulings as a license to incarcerate their own citizens and 
others without judicial review.103 
A similar group of more than twenty former diplomats 
reiterated these arguments when the Guantanamo litigation 
returned to the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush,104 
contending that “denial of habeas corpus to prisoners at 
Guantanamo undermine[s] one of our country’s most 
important diplomatic assets—our perceived commitment to the 
rule of law.”105 
In Samantar v. Yousuf,106 a defendant accused of torture and 
extrajudicial killing argued that he was entitled to immunity 
from suit in US courts because plaintiffs’ claims arose from 
actions allegedly taken in his official capacity when he served as 
a senior government official in Somalia.107 In response, a group 
of twenty-six former US diplomats argued against “a blanket 
extension of sovereign immunity to former foreign officials in 
the narrow and discrete context of their being sued in United 
States courts for alleged torture and extrajudicial executions.”108 
They added: “Plaintiffs allege that a former senior official of a 
brutal and undemocratic regime was responsible for their 
torture and for extrajudicial executions of their family 
members . . . [O]ur fundamental foreign policy commitment to 
human rights and the rule of law—cornerstones of American 
foreign policy for decades—may be vindicated by allowing our 
courts to hear the suit.”109 In short, domestic judicial application 
of international human rights norms helps reinforce the 
                                                                                                             
103. Brief for Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2003 WL 22490560, at *4. 
104. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
105. Brief for Former US Diplomats Diego C. Asencio et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-
1196), 2007 WL 2414900, at *1; see Brief for Former US Diplomats J. Brian Atwood et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) 
(No. 08-368), 2009 WL 216168, at *1–2 (contending that “allowing [the lower court 
decision] to stand will undercut the positive effects on American diplomacy of this 
Court’s decision in Boumediene”). 
106. 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). 
107. See id. at 2282–84. 
108. Brief for Former US Diplomats Morton I. Abramowitz et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555), 
2010 WL 342036, at *6. 
109. Id. at *8–9. 
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nation’s foreign policy commitment to human rights and the 
rule of law. 
One final case merits discussion in this context. In July 
2011, the United States submitted an amicus brief to the 
Supreme Court supporting a stay of execution for Humberto 
Leal Garcia, a Mexican national on death row in Texas.110 The 
Obama administration argued that the “case implicates United 
States foreign-policy interests of the highest order” because 
petitioner’s execution would place “the United States in 
irremediable breach of its international” treaty obligations.111 
The government added that such a breach of treaty obligations 
“would have serious repercussions for United States foreign 
relations.”112 Reportedly, “former president George W. Bush 
also appealed for Leal’s execution to be halted on the grounds it 
could jeopardise . . . US diplomatic interests.”113 Thus, 
Presidents George W. Bush and Obama apparently agree with 
former US diplomats that the United States’ failure to comply 
with its treaty commitments has serious negative foreign policy 
consequences. 
In sum, for the past several decades there has been strong 
bipartisan support in both Congress and the executive branch 
for treating international human rights as a core element of US 
foreign policy. Senior government officials responsible for the 
nation’s international diplomacy agree that the US failure to 
honor its human rights treaty commitments at home has 
significant negative repercussions for the conduct of US foreign 
affairs. 
                                                                                                             
110. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Applications for 
a Stay, Leal Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866 (2011), (Nos. 11A1, 11A2), 2011 WL 
2630156. 
111. Id. at *11–12. Granted, this case involves US obligations under the United 
Nations Charter and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, neither of which is 
a human rights treaty. Nevertheless, in specific cases raising human rights concerns, the 
negative foreign policy consequences of treaty violations are similar, regardless of 
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112. Id. at *12. 
113. Chris McGreal, Humberto Leal Garcia Executed in Texas Despite White House 
Appeal, GUARDIAN (London), July 7, 2011, at 2. Texas executed him despite these 
interventions. See id. 
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B. Domestic Policy Considerations 
International human rights law is rooted in a commitment 
to the values of human dignity, equality, and individual 
autonomy. In the Preamble to the United Nations Charter, the 
drafters affirmed their “faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women.”114 Shortly after adopting the UN Charter, 
the member states of the United Nations endorsed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,115 the foundational document of 
modern international human rights law. Article 1 of the 
Universal Declaration declares: “All human beings are born free 
and equal in dignity and rights.”116 Article 2 adds: “Everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”117 
The principles embodied in the Universal Declaration are 
not “foreign” or “alien” concepts. They are fundamental 
American values,118 codified in the US Constitution, and then 
restated in the Universal Declaration and other international 
human rights instruments. Although the specific language 
included in international human rights treaties is slightly 
different from the language of the US Constitution, the 
underlying values are the same.119 Indeed, public opinion data 
shows that US citizens strongly endorse the core principles of 
international human rights law.120 For example, seventy-seven 
percent of those surveyed agreed that the “government should 
‘protect’ human rights for everyone.”121 Thus, the United States 
should comply with international human right norms because 
                                                                                                             
114. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
115. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
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compliance promotes values cherished by the vast majority of 
US citizens. 
Unfortunately, over the past few decades state and federal 
officials in the United States have adopted a series of laws and 
policies that are at odds with core American values. Politics in 
the United States has been dominated by fear. We fear “career 
criminals,” so state legislators enact laws authorizing life 
imprisonment for petty offenses.122 We fear “terrorists,” so the 
federal executive branch adopts policies authorizing indefinite 
detention of accused terrorists without providing them a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual allegations that 
ostensibly support the decision to detain them.123 We fear 
“aliens,” so Congress enacts laws to remove aliens from the 
United States without affording them the procedural safeguards 
necessary to ensure that they will not be persecuted in the 
destination country.124 
                                                                                                             
122. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2011) (requiring life 
imprisonment for a so-called “third strike”); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 
(2003) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to California’s three strikes law and 
upholding a life sentence for a man convicted of stealing three golf clubs). 
123. Congress has authorized the use of military commissions to conduct criminal 
trials of alleged terrorists. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 
120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006)); Military Commissions 
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 
948a (2006 & Supp. 2010)). However, both the Bush and Obama administrations have 
conceded that there are a significant number of detainees whom the government 
intends to detain indefinitely, without ever subjecting them to criminal trials. See Exec. 
Order No. 13,567, 3 C.F.R. 13567 (2011); Presidential Military Order on Detention, 
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). Congress has never 
enacted legislation that explicitly authorizes such indefinite detention. Pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), individuals 
subject to indefinite detention have a right to file habeas corpus petitions to challenge 
the legality of their detention. However, recent decisions by the D.C. Circuit, which is 
the only appellate court other than the Supreme Court with authority to review such 
petitions, raise doubts as to whether the current system provides a meaningful 
opportunity for alleged terrorists to challenge the factual assertions invoked by the 
government as a basis for their continued detention. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. 
Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451 (2011) (reviewing the D.C. 
Circuit’s development of evolving federal common law standards for judicial review of 
executive detention policies). 
124. In 1996, Congress enacted legislation providing for “expedited removal” of 
certain aliens seeking admission to the United States. Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 422 (2006)), amended by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as 
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Policies based on these types of fears yield results that are 
fundamentally at odds with the higher moral aspirations of most 
Americans. Virtually all Americans agree that torture is morally 
repugnant, but fear of alleged “terrorists“ produces policies that 
make US government officials complicit in acts of torture.125 
Americans value individual freedom, but the United States 
imprisons a higher percentage of its population than any other 
country in the world,126 because fear of crime prompts legislators 
to adopt harsh penal policies that are inconsistent with the 
nation’s moral commitment to individual freedom. The United 
States needs international human rights law to help us realize 
our own higher moral aspirations. We need international 
human rights law as an antidote to the politics of fear that has 
infected the American body politic over the past few decades. 
Some will object that protection of human rights in the 
United States should be based on domestic law, not foreign 
law.127 This objection is unpersuasive because international 
human rights law is not “foreign law.” The United States played 
a very influential role in creating international human rights 
law, and the diplomats who represented our nation in treaty 
negotiations achieved great success in incorporating American 
values into the text of international human rights treaties.128 The 
                                                                                                             
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006)); see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. 
RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 506–07 (5th ed. 2009). Aliens 
subject to expedited removal, including those who express a fear of persecution, are 
entitled to minimal procedural safeguards to protect them against deportation to a 
country where they risk persecution. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra, at 1052–56. 
Hence, critics allege that the expedited removal process, as a practical matter, results in 
deportation of refugees to countries where they will likely be persecuted, contrary to 
US treaty obligations under the 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees. See, e.g., 
Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, Rules are Made to be Broken: How the Process of 
Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 167–72 (2006). 
125. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Jane Mayer, 
Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” Program, NEW 
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. 
126. The United States incarcerates 743 prisoners per 100,000 population. The 
next highest incarceration rate is in Rwanda (595 per 100,000), followed by Russia (550 
per 100,000), Georgia (547 per 100,000), and the Virgin Islands (539 per 100,000). 
Iran ranks 38th at 291 per 100,000. China ranks 117th, at 122 per 100,000. See World 
Prison Brief, INT'L CENTRE FOR PRISON STUD., http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/
worldbrief/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
127. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1971 (2004). 
128. See GLENDON, supra note 118, at 236. 
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US Senate voted in favor of US ratification of the ICCPR, the 
Race Convention, and the Torture Convention.129 Under the 
Constitution, ratified treaties are the “supreme Law of the 
Land.”130 Thus, ratified human rights treaties are part of the 
corpus of supreme federal law.131 
Moreover, this Article does not advocate delegation of 
authority to an international tribunal to pass judgment on US 
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations. To the 
contrary, the proposed legislation in the Appendix would give 
domestic judges, not foreign judges, the power to decide in 
individual cases whether the conduct of domestic government 
officials is consistent with US treaty obligations.132 Moreover, the 
proposed legislation specifies that decisions of foreign and 
international tribunals construing international human rights 
instruments shall be treated merely as persuasive authority, not 
binding authority.133 Thus, the proposal does not raise any 
legitimate concern about ceding sovereignty to foreigners 
because federal and state judges appointed pursuant to standard 
procedures for domestic judicial appointments would retain 
final authority to adjudicate the merits of individual claims and 
defenses. 
Others may object that judicial application of human rights 
norms, as opposed to legislative application of such norms, is 
inconsistent with principles of democratic self-governance.134 To 
state the point more bluntly, they do not want unelected judges 
                                                                                                             
129. The official Senate record does not record the number of Senators voting in 
favor of ratification, but the Senate approved all three treaties by at least a two-thirds 
majority vote. See 140 CONG. REC. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) (Race 
Convention); 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (ICCPR); 136 CONG. 
REC. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Torture Convention). 
130. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
131. Some may argue that the treaties are not part of supreme federal law because 
the United States adopted non-self-executing declarations for all three treaties. The 
proper interpretation of those non-self-executing declarations is contested. See David 
Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1, 35–44 (2002) (summarizing different possible interpretations of non-self-executing 
declarations). However, under any plausible interpretation, the treaties are part of the 
corpus of supreme federal law. See id.  
132. See Appendix. 
133. See Appendix, § 7. 
134. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Democracy and International Human 
Rights Law, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1747–55 (2009). 
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making decisions about US compliance with its treaty 
obligations. 
This objection stands the truth on its head. The relevant 
comparison is not between judicial and legislative application of 
human rights norms. The relevant comparison is between 
judicial application of constitutional norms and judicial 
application of treaty norms. Under current US practice, state and 
federal courts rely primarily on constitutional norms to vindicate 
human rights claims. When US courts apply constitutional law, 
they are applying judge-made law that is not subject to any sort 
of democratic check, because Congress cannot overrule the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. In contrast, 
if US courts applied human rights treaties to resolve 
fundamental rights claims, and Congress disapproved of the 
courts’ application of the relevant treaty provisions, Congress 
could enact legislation to overrule the courts.135 Thus, those who 
favor greater legislative control over fundamental rights claims 
should endorse a proposal for legislation to encourage greater 
judicial reliance on international human rights treaties as an 
alternative to excessive judicial reliance on the Constitution. In 
short, domestic judicial application of international human 
rights treaties—as an alternative to constitutional adjudication—
would enhance democratic self-governance.136 
III. THE LIKELY SOURCE OF REFORM: CONGRESS OR THE 
JUDICIARY? 
Part I showed that the United States has failed to comply 
with certain binding human rights treaty obligations. Part II 
explained why there are sound policy reasons for the United 
                                                                                                             
135. It is well-established that a later-enacted statute takes precedence over a prior 
conflicting treaty as a matter of US domestic law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) (1987). Therefore, if 
Congress objects to an interpretation of a specific human rights treaty provision 
adopted by the courts, Congress could enact a statute to override that provision for the 
purpose of domestic law. Such a statute would not alter the United States’ international 
legal obligations, but it would determine the scope of domestic legal protection for the 
right at issue, as a matter of federal law, unless the courts construed the Constitution to 
be more rights-protective than the statute. 
136. For a more extended presentation of the argument presented in this 
paragraph, see David Sloss, Using International Law to Enhance Democracy, 47 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 1 (2006). 
472 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:445 
States to improve its human rights performance. Hence, the 
question arises: which branch of government is most likely to 
nudge US policies and practices toward improved compliance 
with the nation’s human rights treaty obligations? 
Some scholars have argued that human rights activists 
should look to state and local governments to lead the way in 
promoting domestic implementation of international human 
rights norms.137 Clearly, much useful work can and has been 
done at the state and local level to incorporate international 
norms into domestic government policies.138 However, action at 
the state and local level, without more, is not a viable 
prescription for national compliance with human rights treaty 
obligations; actions by state and local governments are too 
isolated and sporadic to have a significant impact on the United 
States’ overall record of compliance with its treaty 
commitments.139 Hence, national compliance requires unified 
action at the federal level. 
The federal executive has taken some steps to improve 
domestic implementation of international human rights norms. 
For example, President Clinton adopted an executive order to 
enhance domestic implementation of international human 
rights treaty obligations.140 However, unilateral executive action 
is unlikely to have a significant impact on US compliance with its 
treaty obligations. Human rights treaties regulate the conduct of 
state and local government officers in thousands of daily 
interactions with private persons. The federal executive branch 
lacks the resources to monitor all of those daily interactions. In 
contrast, private individuals are well-situated to monitor state 
and local government compliance with human rights treaties 
because they are directly affected by treaty violations and they 
have an incentive to correct those violations. Private monitoring 
                                                                                                             
137. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for 
Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001); 
Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006). 
138. See Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights 
Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 474–79 (2008). 
139. To the best of my knowledge, scholars who have urged greater reliance on 
state and local governments do not seriously dispute this proposition. See Powell, supra 
note 137; Resnik, supra note 137. 
140. See Exec. Order No. 13,107, 3 C.F.R. 13107 (1998). 
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will not have a significant impact on treaty compliance, though, 
unless private individuals have access to a court that is 
empowered to adjudicate human rights claims.141 
The president cannot empower courts to adjudicate claims 
based on human rights treaties because the United States 
ratified the ICCPR, the Race Convention, and the Torture 
Convention subject to declarations specifying that all three 
treaties are non-self-executing.142 The precise meaning of those 
declarations is disputed.143 At a minimum, though, the non-self-
executing declarations mean that individuals cannot file suit to 
enforce human rights treaties unless Congress enacts legislation 
to authorize judicial enforcement. Per the Supreme Court 
decision in Medellin v. Texas, the president lacks the 
constitutional authority to convert a non-self-executing treaty 
into a self-executing treaty.144 Therefore, unilateral presidential 
action is not a viable solution to the problem of US 
noncompliance with its treaty obligations. 
Given the shortcomings of both the federal executive 
branch and state and local governments, it is necessary to 
consider both Congress and the federal judiciary as potential 
agents of change. I contend that Congress is the branch most 
likely to initiate progressive human rights reforms within the 
next decade. This claim may seem surprising to many readers. 
For the past half-century, legal discourse has been shaped by a 
dominant image that portrays the federal courts as the primary 
guarantor of fundamental human rights. That image was 
certainly accurate during the Warren Court and into the 
                                                                                                             
141. In theory, the federal government could create a new federal administrative 
agency to adjudicate human rights claims against state and local government officers. 
However, for the reasons explained below, creation of a new federal administrative 
agency is neither realistic nor desirable. See infra text after note 167. If the government 
wants to empower individuals to bring claims based on human rights treaties, the best 
approach is to empower individuals to bring those claims in the same courts where they 
are already litigating statutory and constitutional “human rights” claims. 
142. See ICCPR: Declarations and Reservations, United States, supra note 31; Race 
Convention: Declarations and Reservations, United States, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 6, 2012); Torture Convention: Declarations and 
Reservations, United States, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#12 (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2012); see also Sloss, supra note 19, at 131. 
143. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 144–71. 
144. 552 U.S. 491, 525 (2008). 
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1970s.145 But there is nothing inherent in our separation-of-
powers system that makes the judiciary the guardian of human 
rights, or Congress the enemy of human rights. Indeed, from 
the 1890s until the 1930s, the Supreme Court was dominated by 
conservative Justices who routinely thwarted progressive 
legislation designed to enhance protection for human rights.146 
During that era, Progressives placed their faith in Congress to 
promote broader protection for human rights and conservatives 
placed their faith in the federal judiciary to protect the interests 
of corporate America.147 The point is that the ideological 
alignment of the judicial and legislative branches is historically 
contingent. During some historical periods, the judiciary has 
been the leading champion of human rights, but in other 
historical eras Congress has been more receptive to a human 
rights agenda. 
A. The Federal Judiciary as an Agent of Human Rights Reform 
To appreciate the role of the federal judiciary as a potential 
agent of human rights reform, it is helpful to distinguish three 
possible mechanisms that, in theory, federal judges could use to 
promote compliance with human rights treaty obligations: 
“silent” judicial application, “indirect” judicial application, and 
“direct” judicial application. Federal courts often promote 
compliance with international norms by applying domestic 
constitutional or statutory provisions without mentioning 
analogous treaty provisions. This is “silent” judicial application. 
For example, Article 19 of the ICCPR protects freedom of 
expression,148 but the First Amendment provides equal or 
greater protection for freedom of expression than is available 
under Article 19.149 Thus, US courts promote compliance with 
treaty obligations under Article 19 by applying the First 
Amendment, even if they do not mention Article 19 or related 
                                                                                                             
145. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Remembrance of Things Past?: Reflections 
on the Warren Court and the Struggle for Civil Rights, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1055 (2002). 
146. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 
19–26 (2000). 
147. See id. at 11–33. 
148. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 19. 
149. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 94, at 1233–52 (comparing protection for 
freedom of expression in US constitutional law and international human rights law). 
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international norms in their judicial opinions. When the United 
States ratified the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race 
Convention, the Bush and Clinton administrations assured the 
Senate that this type of “silent” judicial application would help 
ensure compliance with US treaty obligations.150 Since that time, 
silent judicial application has been the primary mechanism the 
federal judiciary has employed to help promote US compliance 
with its human rights treaty obligations. 
Courts apply international human rights treaties 
“indirectly” when they apply a domestic constitutional or 
statutory provision as a rule of decision, and they invoke a treaty 
provision to help interpret that domestic constitutional or 
statutory norm. For example, US courts routinely invoke the 
Torture Convention when they consider claims for “withholding 
of removal” under 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.151 That regulation was 
designed, in part, to implement Section 2242 of the Foreign 
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”),152 a 
statute Congress enacted to implement US obligations under 
Article 3 of the Torture Convention. Colloquially, people refer 
to these types of claims as “Torture Convention claims.” 
Technically, though, the courts are not applying the Torture 
Convention directly when they adjudicate such claims. Rather, 
courts are directly applying the relevant statute and regulations, 
and they are invoking the treaty indirectly as an aid to 
interpreting the governing statute and regulations.153 
Courts apply treaties “directly” when they apply a treaty 
provision as a rule of decision to resolve a disputed issue in a 
case. US courts often apply treaties directly in this way. For 
example, US courts have decided hundreds of cases involving 
                                                                                                             
150. See Sloss, supra note 19, at 183–88. 
151. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2011). 
152. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 
2242, 112 Stat. 2681-761, 2681-822 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6501 (2006)). 
153. It is important to distinguish in this respect between the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”) and the draft legislation included in the 
Appendix. FARRA did not authorize courts to apply Article 3 of the Torture 
Convention directly as a rule of decision. Instead, FARRA authorized federal agencies 
to enact regulations to implement US treaty obligations. See id. In contrast, the draft 
legislation in the Appendix would authorize state and federal courts to apply relevant 
provisions of the ICCPR, the Torture Convention, and the Race Convention directly as 
rules of decision. See Appendix. 
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direct application of the Warsaw Convention154 to resolve 
controversies related to international air carriage.155 However, 
US courts almost never apply international human rights treaties 
directly. When the United States ratified the ICCPR, the Torture 
Convention, and the Race Convention, it attached declarations 
stipulating that the treaties are “not self-executing.”156 Those 
declarations have effectively barred direct judicial application of 
human rights treaties. Congress could enact legislation to 
authorize direct application;157 until Congress does so, however, 
courts will continue to cite the non-self-executing declarations as 
a bar to direct application of human rights treaties. 
In theory, the United States could achieve excellent 
compliance with its human rights treaty obligations—even 
without direct application of human rights treaties—if US courts 
made aggressive use of their power to apply human rights 
treaties indirectly as an aid to construing analogous statutory 
and constitutional provisions, or if courts adopted liberal 
interpretations of those provisions and applied the treaties 
“silently.” However, the analysis in Part I demonstrates that the 
combined effect of silent and indirect application has failed to 
achieve a satisfactory record of US compliance with its human 
rights treaty obligations. Moreover, it is very unlikely, at least for 
the next decade, that the federal judiciary will utilize its 
acknowledged power to engage in “indirect” and “silent” treaty 
application to promote greater compliance with the nation’s 
human rights treaty obligations. There are two reasons why this 
                                                                                                             
154. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International 
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw 
Convention].  
155. See David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY 
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., 2009). 
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
157. There are two aspects to the claim that Congress has the constitutional 
authority to enact such legislation. First, Congress has the authority to reverse the effect 
of the non-self-executing declarations by empowering courts to apply human rights 
treaties directly as rules of decision. This proposition is not controversial. Second, 
Congress has the power to regulate matters that would otherwise be regulated 
exclusively by state and local governments. This proposition is controversial. The 
controversy hinges primarily on the continued vitality of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 
416 (1920). See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. As noted above, I believe 
that Congress’ treaty implementation power under Missouri is sufficient to sustain the 
constitutional validity of legislation that Congress deems necessary to ensure 
compliance with US treaty obligations. See supra note 65. 
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is so. First, the federal judiciary is quite conservative. And 
second, the composition of the federal judiciary changes very 
slowly. 
In 1968, President Johnson nominated Associate Justice 
Abe Fortas to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice. Senate 
deliberations proceeded in the midst of the politically charged 
1968 presidential campaign. The Republican presidential 
nominee, Richard Nixon, worked behind the scenes with Senate 
Republicans to defeat Fortas’ nomination.158 Nixon took office 
in January 1969, determined to alter the ideological 
composition of the federal judiciary. Over the next three years, 
he appointed a new Chief Justice (Warren Burger) and three 
new Associate Justices.159 These appointments initiated a 
dramatic shift to the right: in the two decades from 1970 to 
1991, Republican presidents appointed one Chief Justice 
(Rehnquist) and nine Associate Justices.160 The only Democratic 
president during this period, Jimmy Carter, did not appoint a 
single Supreme Court Justice. Since the 1968 presidential 
campaign, every Republican president has made a campaign 
pledge to appoint conservative judges. With limited exceptions, 
they have delivered on their pledges. At present, about sixty 
percent of federal appellate judges are Republican appointees, 
and only forty percent are Democratic appointees.161 
Sophisticated empirical studies show that the median federal 
                                                                                                             
158. See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE 
NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 2–4 (2001). 
159. See RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE US SUPREME COURT 
36–45 (1980). 
160. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. OF 
AM., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
161. As of September 2011, there were 159 US Court of Appeals judges (including 
senior judges) appointed by Republican Presidents, and 108 US Court of Appeals 
judges (including senior judges) appointed by Democratic Presidents. See Number of US 
Court of Appeals Judges Appointed by Republican/Democratic Presidents, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov (follow “Judge and Judgeships” hyperlink; then follow 
“Biographical Directory of Judges” hyperlink; then follow “Select research categories” 
hyperlink; then select “Court type”, “Party of Nominating President”, and “Limit 
Query to Sitting Judges”, then search “U.S. Court of Appeals” for “Court type”, 
“Republican” or “Democrat” for “Party of Nominating President” and “All Sitting 
Judges” for “Limit Query to Sitting Judges”; then follow “Search” hyperlink) (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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appellate judge is moderately conservative,162 and conservative 
judges outnumber liberal judges by a factor of about 1.8 to 1.163 
Thus, the current federal judiciary, as a group, is not 
ideologically inclined to adopt the “silent” or “indirect” treaty 
application strategies that would enhance compliance with US 
human rights treaty obligations. 
Moreover, the composition of the federal judiciary changes 
slowly. There are currently 179 authorized judgeships for US 
Court of Appeals judges, and 677 authorized judgeships for US 
District Court judges.164 On average, in a four-year presidential 
term, a president appoints about thirty-nine US Court of 
Appeals judges and about 152 US District Court judges.165 In 
light of these figures, it is likely that conservative judges will still 
outnumber liberal judges at the end of President Obama’s first 
term. If Obama serves a full eight years, there might well be a 
significant ideological shift in the federal judiciary by the end of 
his second term. However, given the force of stare decisis, there 
would still be a lag time before that ideological change had a 
significant impact on overall trends in judicial decision-
making—especially if the Supreme Court retains its conservative 
majority during this period. 
In sum, absent new congressional legislation, the federal 
judiciary is unlikely to be a significant agent of human rights 
reform in the next decade. The non-self-executing declarations 
stand as a bar to direct application of human rights treaties. 
Courts could employ strategies of silent or indirect treaty 
application to promote compliance with human rights treaties, 
but most judges are not ideologically predisposed to employ 
those types of strategies. Finally, the ideological composition of 
                                                                                                             
162. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of 
the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1173 
(2010). 
163. See id. at 1203–05 (providing judicial ideology scores for 143 federal appellate 
judges, including ninety-two who received conservative ratings and fifty who received 
liberal ratings). 
164. See Federal Judgeships, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).  
165. These figures are based on the number of judicial appointments by 
Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush between 1977 and 2008. See 
Judgeship Appointments by President, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/Viewer.aspx?doc=/
uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/apptsbypres.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
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the federal courts changes slowly. Therefore, those who favor 
progressive human rights reforms should consider pressing 
Congress for legislative solutions. 
B. Congress as an Agent of Human Rights Reform 
The preceding analysis suggests that state and local 
governments, the federal executive, and the federal judiciary—
acting separately or in combination—are unlikely to adopt the 
measures needed to achieve satisfactory compliance with the 
nation’s human rights treaty obligations. Therefore, to ensure 
fulfillment of US treaty commitments, new federal legislation is 
necessary to empower individuals to raise claims and defenses 
based on human rights treaties, and to empower courts to apply 
those treaties on behalf of individuals. Draft legislation along 
these lines is included in the Appendix. The proposed 
legislation raises three distinct sets of questions: 1) why does the 
draft legislation focus on direct judicial enforcement of human 
rights treaties, rather than some other mechanism for 
promoting compliance?; 2) is it realistic to expect Congress to 
enact legislation along these lines?; and 3) if enacted, would the 
proposed legislation actually have the intended effect? This 
Section briefly addresses these three questions. 
To begin, it is noteworthy that the United States, as a party 
to the ICCPR, has a treaty obligation: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have an effective 
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall 
have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, 
administrative . . . authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the State . . . ; 
[and] 
c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce 
such remedies when granted.166 
                                                                                                             
166. ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 2, para. 3. 
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In short, the ICCPR obligates states to ensure that 
individuals have access to a competent tribunal with authority to 
decide the merits of individual claims, and to grant remedies to 
individuals who are victims of human rights treaty violations. 
The ICCPR does not require direct application of human 
rights treaties. In theory, the United States could fulfill its treaty 
obligations without direct application if US courts applied 
human rights treaties indirectly and/or silently. However, for 
the reasons discussed above, the combination of silent and 
indirect application is unlikely to yield satisfactory compliance in 
the near future.167 
The treaty does not specifically require judicial 
enforcement. In theory, a state could effectuate its obligation to 
provide individual remedies by creating a sophisticated 
administrative enforcement mechanism. However, in the United 
States, state and federal courts already have tremendous 
experience adjudicating “human rights” claims against federal, 
state, and local government officers. US courts tend to rely on 
constitutional and statutory law, rather than treaty law, to resolve 
these types of claims, but they clearly have the expertise to 
handle claims of this nature. In contrast, there is no existing 
administrative tribunal with jurisdiction sufficiently broad to 
adjudicate the range of claims that could conceivably be raised 
under human rights treaties. Thus, if the United States chooses 
to provide a forum for direct application of human rights 
treaties, it is much more efficient to channel these claims into 
existing judicial institutions, rather than creating a new 
administrative tribunal for this purpose. In short, the proposed 
legislation focuses on direct judicial enforcement because that is 
the most efficient way to fulfill the US treaty obligation to ensure 
that individuals have access to a competent tribunal with 
authority to decide the merits of individual claims. 
Given that the current House of Representatives is heavily 
influenced by “Tea Party” Republicans, it is unrealistic to think 
that the current Congress would support anything like the draft 
legislation in the Appendix. However, legislative majorities 
change quickly. Democrats gained fifty-five seats in the House of 
Representatives and thirteen seats in the Senate between the 
                                                                                                             
167. See supra notes 157–165 and accompanying text. 
2012] LEGISLATING HUMAN RIGHTS 481 
109th and the 111th Congresses.168 Republicans gained sixty-
three House seats and six Senate seats between the 111th and 
112th Congresses.169 It is impossible to predict how long the 
Republican Party will maintain its current majority in the House 
of Representatives, but that majority will not last forever. Given 
the slow rate of change in the composition of the federal 
judiciary,170 Congress is more likely than the courts to make a 
significant ideological move in a liberal direction over the next 
decade. 
Moreover, solid bipartisan majorities have supported 
previous “human rights” legislation. When Congress enacted 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,171 a sizeable majority of both 
Democrats and Republicans in both the House and the Senate 
voted in favor of the legislation.172 Similarly, a significant 
majority from both parties in both Houses of Congress 
supported the Voting Rights Act of 1965,173 and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990.174 Thus, one should not assume 
                                                                                                             
168. During the 109th Congress, Democrats held 202 House seats and 44 Senate 
seats. In the 111th Congress, Democrats held 257 House seats and 57 Senate seats. See 
Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), OFF. OF THE CLERK, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPS., http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/partyDiv.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter House Party Divisions]; Party Division in the Senate, 
1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Senate Party 
Divisions]. 
169. During the 111th Congress, Republicans held 178 House seats and 41 Senate 
seats. In the 112th Congress, Republicans hold 242 House seats and 47 Senate seats. See 
House Party Divisions, supra note 168; Senate Party Divisions, supra note 168. 
170. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text. 
171. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006)). 
172. House Democrats voted 152 to 96 in favor of the legislation. House 
Republicans voted 138 to 34 in favor. Senate Democrats voted 46 to 21 in favor. Senate 
Republicans voted 27 to 6 in favor. See [88th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 8,065 (Feb. 
10, 1964) (providing the House of Representatives voting record); [88th Cong.] Cong. 
Index 8,129 (June 19, 1964) (providing the Senate voting record). 
173. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)). House Democrats voted 217 to 54 in favor of the 
legislation. House Republicans voted 111 to 20 in favor. Senate Democrats voted 49 to 
17 in favor. Senate Republicans voted 30 to 1 in favor. See [89th Cong.] Cong. Index 
(CCH) 9,146 (Aug. 3, 1965) (providing the House of Representatives voting record); 
[89th Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 9,147–48 (Aug. 4, 1965) (providing the Senate 
voting record). 
174. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006)). House Democrats voted 248 to 3 in 
favor of the legislation. House Republicans voted 155 to 17 in favor. Senate Democrats 
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that Republicans would uniformly oppose legislation designed 
to promote judicial enforcement of human rights treaties.  
Finally, assuming that Congress did enact legislation similar 
to the draft statute in the Appendix, one might wonder whether 
“conservative” judges would thwart the purpose of the 
legislation by adopting narrow interpretations of human rights 
treaty provisions. This outcome seems unlikely. To understand 
why, it is helpful to divide so-called “conservative” judges into 
two groups. A minority of conservative judges may be 
ideologically opposed to vigorous judicial application of norms 
protecting human dignity, liberty, and equality. However, I 
believe that the majority of conservative judges would 
enthusiastically support judicial application of such norms, 
provided that Congress signals its support for judicial 
enforcement by enacting appropriate legislation. In other 
words, the conservative ideology of many judges is not a 
manifestation of ideological opposition to human rights. Rather, 
their conservative orientation reflects an ideological 
commitment to a democratic process, wherein Congress takes 
the lead in determining the content of the rights to be enforced 
by the judiciary. If this assessment is correct, then the fear that 
conservative judges would thwart the purpose of the proposed 
legislation is unwarranted.175 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout history, great powers have subordinated law to 
power in their conduct of international relations. The United 
States claims to be a different kind of great power. As a nation 
founded on the rule of law ideal, we claim to be committed to 
the rule of law not only in domestic affairs, but also in 
international affairs. It is time for the United States to back up 
this claim with concrete action. To demonstrate its commitment 
to the rule of law in international affairs, the United States 
                                                                                                             
voted 44 to 0 in favor. Senate Republicans voted 32 to 8 in favor. See [101st Cong.] 
Cong. Index (CCH) 37,131 (May 22, 1990) (providing the  House of Representatives 
voting record); [101st Cong.] Cong. Index (CCH) 23,021 (Sept. 7, 1989) (providing 
the Senate voting record). 
175. In addition, the treaty interpretation provisions in § 7 of the draft legislation, 
as well as the findings in § 1 and the statement of purpose in § 2, help minimize the 
risk that judges would thwart the purpose of the legislation. 
2012] LEGISLATING HUMAN RIGHTS 483 
should enact federal legislation to facilitate domestic judicial 
application of international human rights treaties. Until we are 
ready for US courts to apply international human rights norms 
as a constraint on federal, state, and local government action, 
our ostensible commitment to human rights will be more 
rhetorical than real. Conversely, by enacting the recommended 
legislation, the United States could become the first great power 
in world history that actually subordinates power to law in its 
conduct of international relations. Moreover, the proposed 
legislation would enhance the United States’ moral authority to 
speak on behalf of oppressed people everywhere who are 
struggling to realize the aspirations expressed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
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APPENDIX 
Human Rights Treaty Implementation Act of 2011 (Draft Legislation) 
 
Sec. 1: Findings  
It is in the foreign policy interests of the United States 
to ensure that other countries view us as a leader in the 
field of international human rights. Certain actions 
undertaken by the United States Government in the 
context of the war on terror have tarnished the United 
States’ reputation in this regard. 
Sec. 2: Purpose  
(a) This legislation is designed to enhance the United 
States’ reputation as a leader in the field of 
international human rights, and to enhance U.S. 
compliance with its treaty obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT).  
(b) This legislation empowers individuals to raise 
claims and defenses in state and federal courts under 
the ICCPR, CERD and CAT, and authorizes courts to 
provide judicial remedies for individuals whose treaty 
rights are violated.  
(c) This legislation effectively removes the non-self-
executing declarations attached to the treaties. 
However, it does not alter any of the other 
reservations, understandings or declarations that the 
United States adopted when it ratified those treaties. 
Sec. 3: Defenses 
(a) In any case where a federal or state government 
initiates a criminal proceeding against a person, that 
person shall be authorized to invoke the ICCPR, the 
CERD or the CAT as a defense in the criminal 
prosecution. 
(b) A defendant’s right to invoke these treaties shall be 
subject to the same procedural limitations— including 
procedural default rules—that apply to similar 
constitutional and statutory defenses.  
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(c) State and federal courts shall be obligated to rule 
on the merits of human rights treaty defenses to the 
same extent that they would address the merits of a 
similar federal constitutional or statutory defense. 
(d) This section shall also apply to any civil action 
initiated by a state or federal government that involves 
a threat of civil sanctions. 
Sec. 4: Suits Against Federal Agencies and Officers  
A federal agency action that infringes rights protected 
under the ICCPR, the CERD or the CAT shall be 
deemed a “legal wrong” within the meaning of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. An 
individual harmed by such a legal wrong is authorized 
to pursue a claim against the relevant government 
agency or officer in accordance with the terms of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Sec. 5: Suits Against State and Local Officers  
(a) The ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT create federal 
rights that are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
(b) An individual who faces a threat of future harm 
posed by a prospective or ongoing violation of the 
ICCPR, the CERD, or the CAT committed by a state or 
local government officer shall have a right of action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in accordance with 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  
(c) An individual who has suffered harm as a result of 
a completed violation of the ICCPR, the CERD, or the 
CAT shall not have a right of action for money 
damages under this section. 
Sec. 6: Habeas Corpus 
(a) The ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT are “treaties 
of the United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). The ICCPR, the CERD 
and the CAT are “laws of the United States” within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(a) and 2255(f)(2). The 
ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT constitute “Federal 
law” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 
The writ of habeas corpus extends to prisoners who 
are in custody in violation of those treaties. 
(b) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) is hereby amended by 
striking the “or” after the semicolon and adding the 
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following clause: “or the claim relies on The Human 
Rights Treaty Implementation Act of 2011 and the 
prior application was filed before enactment of that 
Act; or” 
(c) 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) is hereby amended by 
changing the period to a semicolon and adding the 
following clause: “or a claim that relies on The Human 
Rights Treaty Implementation Act of 2011 that could 
not have been raised in a prior motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.” 
(d) In states where state law precludes a prisoner from 
filing more than one habeas petition in state court, but 
allows a prisoner to file a second petition if the legal 
basis for his claim was previously unavailable, it shall be 
understood that this legislation provides a legal basis 
for claims under the ICCPR, the CERD and the CAT 
that was not available prior to the enactment of this 
legislation. 
Sec. 7: Treaty Interpretation  
(a) In adjudicating cases in which individuals raise 
claims or defenses under the ICCPR, the CERD or the 
CAT, courts responsible for interpreting the relevant 
treaty provisions shall consult documents issued by the 
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and the 
Committee Against Torture. Such documents shall be 
treated as persuasive, but not binding, authority for 
the purpose of interpreting the relevant treaties. 
(b) Courts shall also consider decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights interpreting 
analogous provisions of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. Such decisions shall be treated as 
persuasive, but not binding, authority for the purpose 
of interpreting the relevant treaties. 
(c) When interpreting the ICCPR, the CERD, and the 
CAT, courts shall be guided by the canon of liberal 
interpretation, which holds: “If the treaty admits of two 
interpretations, and one is limited, and the other 
liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude 
private rights; why should not the most liberal 
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exposition be adopted?” Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 
249 (1830). 
(d) In any case in which state or federal courts are 
called upon to interpret the ICCPR, the CERD or the 
CAT, the federal government’s views concerning the 
proper interpretation of the treaty shall be entitled to 
some deference, except insofar as the government 
adopted the particular interpretation in the context of 
litigation in which a federal government agency or 
officer is a party. 
Sec. 8: Enemy Combatants 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to alter the rules 
governing enemy combatants that have been 
established pursuant to the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, and the 
Military Commissions Act of 2009. 
 
